Articles of Interest
Medical Discharge and the Duty to Accommodate in the RCMP
by Norman Sabourin, Executive Director and Senior Counsel
March 2002
Police work is sometimes very arduous. The demands of the job can cause
injury or impairment over a long period of time. Even more serious are
the dangerous situations faced by police, which sometimes result in
serious injury for members. What happens when a member is no longer able
to perform the duties of their position because of a medical or mental
condition?
Pursuant to the RCMP Act and Regulations, a member can be
discharged from the Force by reason of physical or mental disability. The
Regulations provide that the member must be given a written notice
explaining the process to be followed in seeking that member's discharge.
Unless there is an agreement to the contrary by the member, a medical
board must be convened. It consists of at least three medical
practitioners; the member can nominate his or her own physician to the
board. The medical board must determine the degree of the member's
impairment and report its findings and recommendations to the appropriate
officer and to the member. In accordance with the Commissioner's
Standing Orders (Representation), 1997, the member is entitled to be
assisted by a Member Representative, who is a lawyer paid for by the
RCMP.
Some questions that can be asked about this process are: At what point is
a member so impaired that they should be dismissed? Should all members be
required to perform each and every task that can be assigned to a general
duty constable? Is the Force required to take special measures to take a
member's impairment into account? What information is relevant in
deciding such issues?
Some of these questions have been the subject of much debate in recent
years, particularly in the context of human rights legislation and the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Recently, the Supreme
Court of Canada has clarified what obligations exist for employers in
relation to employees who have a disability.
The Meiorin Case
The key decision that explains the duties of employers is the Meiorin
case (British Columbia (Public Service Employee Relations Commission)
v. BCGSEU, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 3), decided by the Supreme Court in 1999.
Ms Meiorin was a forest firefighter employed by the government of British
Columbia. She performed her duties well and received satisfactory
performance evaluations. After three years on the job, she failed part of
a test that had been implemented to measure the aerobic capacity of
firefighters. The test had been devised following a recommendation made
by government researchers, on the basis that forest firefighters should
be in good physical shape in order to maintain their own safety and that
of their colleagues.
After Ms Meiorin failed part of this physical test, she was informed that
she would be discharged from her position for failing to meet a
legitimate occupational standard. This decision was challenged by her
union, all the way to the Supreme Court of Canada.
In reviewing the case, the Court reviewed what had been done to date in
analyzing discrimination issues, and decided that a new approach was
needed to give full effect to the intent of human rights legislation. The
test developed by the Court has now become the norm for analyzing serious
allegations of discrimination in the employment field.
The Court found that employers have a right to set standards for
occupations, but if a standard seems on its face to be discriminatory,
employers must show that the standard is a "bona fide occupational
requirement" or "BFOR." To do this, the Court set a three-part test.
First, the standard must be rationally connected to the performance of
the job; second, the standard must have been adopted in good faith, in
the belief that it was necessary for the fulfilment of the purpose or
goal; third, the standard must be necessary to accomplish the duties of
the job. It must be shown that it is impossible, without imposing undue
hardship on the employer, to accommodate an individual employee who is
excluded by the standard because of their personal condition.
The three-part test developed by the Supreme Court requires that an
employer bring forward evidence to defend its position that an
occupational standard constitutes a BFOR. The employer must do so for
each of the elements of the test.
The first element is that the standard must be rationally connected to
the performance of the job. Here, the employer must explain what the
standard is designed to achieve and show that there is a rational
relationship between the standard and the desired objective. Often, the
standard is aimed at promoting safety or efficiency in the work- place.
The Court explained that, in most cases, it is simple to show such a
rational connection. The employer simply must show a legitimate reason
for the general objective it seeks to achieve. However, there must be
evidence presented. For example, in the Meiorin case, the Supreme Court
was not convinced that there was a rational connection between the
physical fitness standard and the safe and efficient performance of the
duties of a firefighter:
"There was no credible evidence showing that the prescribed aerobic
capacity was necessary for either men or women to perform the work of a
forest fire- fighter satisfactorily. On the contrary, Ms. Meiorin had in
the past performed her work well, without apparent risk to herself, her
colleagues or the public."
Second, the standard that has been chosen must be necessary to accomplish
the duties of the job. What the Court said is that it must be shown that
the standard was adopted because the employer honestly believed that it
needed this standard in order to get the job done, and that the standard
was not adopted for some other reason. Some key questions that could be
asked at this stage are: In what circumstances was the standard or policy
adopted? Was it created to respond to a specific problem? Who adopted it
and how was it put in force? How was the standard or policy developed?
These questions can show that an employer legitimately was trying to find
ways to ensure that the required duties of a position are carried out. On
the other hand, if a standard was adopted with other objectives in mind,
it will fail this part of the test.
The final and third element of the test requires the employer to show
that it is impossible, without undue hardship, to accommodate an
individual employee who is excluded by the standard because of their
personal condition. This is the most challenging part of the test and it
places a significant onus on the employer, who must basically demonstrate
the degree of hardship that would result from providing a job, inside the
organization, for the employee.
Here the Supreme Court explained that an occupational standard must
accommodate factors relating to the unique capabilities and inherent
worth and dignity of every individual, up to the point of undue
hardship. In other words, the employer must focus on how an employee
can continue to play a productive and meaningful role in the
organization, not on why an employee is incapable of performing to the
ideal standard.
Some key questions that can be asked at this stage are: Did the employer
look at alternative standards to get the job done? Is the standard
properly designed in order to minimize the burden on those required to
meet it? Does the standard itself provide for individual accommodation in
some cases? Is it essential that all employees meet the occupational
standard for the employer to accomplish its goals?
In that last instance, information about the treatment of other employees
placed in similar situations may be critical in establishing whether or
not accommodation is possible. Indeed, if an employer has accommodated
other employees in the past, it will be much more difficult to
successfully argue that further accommodation is impossible. To that end,
access to information held by the employer may be essential to the
analysis.
Again, the onus is on the employer to present evidence. The nature of the
evidence must be serious and persuasive in nature. The evidence would
usually be statistical, medical or presented by experts. The courts have
said that evidence based on "common sense," assumptions or impressions
will not be sufficient.
Finally, the employer must show what actions it took to try and
accommodate the employee or, in the alternative, why it is simply not
possible to accommodate the employee within the organization.
The extent of the duty to accommodate
The test developed by the Supreme Court requires a case-by-case approach
in situations of alleged discrimination. In examining different
situations, recent decisions of lower courts and labour arbitrators do
help to draw some parameters and give guidance on the scope of the duty
to accommodate.
In Re Cape Breton Health Care Complex and Canadian Auto Workers, Local
4600 (90 L.A.C., 4th, 403), an arbitrator reviewed the situation of a
lab technician who, after receiving cancer treatments, developed
post-traumatic stress disorder. This made it very difficult for him to
take blood samples from patients at the clinic, which was a central part
of his work. To address the situation, the employer first gave him
part-time work, and eventually moved him to another job that did not
require him to take blood samples but that paid $5.00 less an hour than
before. The adjudicator found that this did not meet the duty to
accommodate and that "moving an employee to a lower paid job is not
accommodation." The adjudicator also took into account evidence that
suggested that, in the case of other employees, the employer had found
accommodation that did not entail a reduction of salary. For example, one
lab technician was assigned to do "media preparation full-time" to
accommodate his inability to do other lab work.
Where the employer is seeking accommodation, it may well have to do more
than simply look at existing jobs within the organization. Professor
Michael Lynk writes that "the law requires an employer to determine
whether existing positions can be adjusted, adapted or modified for the
employee, or whether there are other positions in the workplace that
might be suitable for the employee." (The Duty to Accommodate in the
Canadian Workplace, paper presented at the Infonex conference in
Ottawa, March 25th, 2002).
How much hardship is "undue"?
A key decision of the Supreme Court discussed in 1990 several factors
that are relevant in assessing whether an employer faces "undue" hardship
in cases of accommodation (Central Alberta Dairy Pool v. Alberta
(Human Rights Commission) [1990] 2 SCR 489). These include issues
such as financial cost, impact on employee morale, safety concerns and
the size of the employer's organization.
Financial cost can become an undue hardship, but only where the cost is
so high that it threatens the employer's ability to function, for example
because the accommodation would have a serious impact on financial
viability or that it would fundamentally change the nature of the
employer's operations. Again, the burden here rests with the employer to
prove that an analysis was done to quantify the costs of the
accommodation.
Impact on employee morale is a significant concern and can become an
undue hardship in some instances. However, the Supreme Court has said
that "it is a factor that must be applied with caution." (Central
Okanagan School District No. 23 v. Renaud [1992] 2 SCR 970). For
example, if employees have stereotypical attitudes about whether a person
with a disability can work alongside other employees, this will not be a
relevant consideration. If accommodation causes serious disruption for
established rights of other employees, say because of redefining of job
duties or loss of seniority rights, then it is a factor that must be
considered.
Safety concerns are also a very important factor. An accommodation that
would jeopardize the safety of employees will often constitute undue
hardship. But if only the safety of the employee in question is
concerned, then the employer might have to assess the willingness of that
employee to assume the risk to their own safety. In the Bhinder case
(Bhinder v. Canadian National Railway Co. [1985] 2 SCR 561), the
Supreme Court pointed out that "since no greater danger would be caused
to others because of his non-compliance, any decision to accept greater
risk should be left to Bhinder himself." This type of rationale is
evident in the Ontario Human Rights Commission's Policy and Guidelines
on Disability and the Duty to Accommodate, which provide that "Where
possible, persons with disabilities should be allowed to assume risk with
dignity, subject to the undue hardship standard." Thus, an employee who
is willing to accept a certain measure of risk, in order to continue
working, could be accommodated, particularly if there is no risk to the
health or safety of others.
The size of the employer's organization is one very important factor.
Obviously, a very small employer has neither the resources nor the
flexibility to make broad accommodations for employees. A large employer,
on the other hand, usually has more flexibility in adjusting the job
duties of positions, assigning work to different individuals, creating
new positions in the organization or instituting new methods of
operation.
In Re NAV Canada and International Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers (101 L.A.C. 4th, 158), the arbitrator had to determine how
far the employer's obligation extended in the case of an employee who had
a serious fear of flying. The employee, an electronics technician, was
posted in Prince George and, as an accommodation, had been granted an
exception from the requirement to fly to remote locations to service
equipment. The employer was able to do this because there were sufficient
technicians in Prince George who could fly as needed to remote locations.
Some years later, the employee asked for a transfer to Cranbrook, to
which he was entitled under the collective agreement. The employer
refused on the basis that it did not have enough technicians in Cranbrook
and that the open position would have to be filled by someone who could
fly. In applying the Meiorin test, the arbitrator found that there was a
legitimate reason for the discrimination since "The employer is charged
with the high responsibility of providing and servicing navigational aids
for safe air travel in Canada" and that technicians were needed to fly to
remote locations. In applying the third part of the test, the arbitrator
found that the employer would indeed face undue hardship if it further
accommodated the employee. Of significance was the fact that there
already was one employee in Cranbrook who suffered from a serious fear of
flying and who was being accommodated.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court has set out a test to apply in order to assess the
scope of the duty to accommodate. For the RCMP, in matters of medical
discharge, the Force will have to find a suitable position for a member
with an impairment who wishes to continue working, or else demonstrate
that it would face undue hardship by doing so. This will require
significant changes to existing policies within the Force which,
currently, only provide that a member with a disability be considered for
positions for which that member is fully qualified. There is nothing in
existing Force policy that provides for alternate measures such as
investing in training and professional development to prepare a member
for an existing position, or alternately to create a new position for
which the member would be q qualified. As the Committee recently pointed
out in cases G-266 and G-267, "The duty to accommodate assuredly exists
and it is far more extensive than what the Force's own internal policy
recognizes."